The aim of the work is to provide a language to reason about Closed Interactions, i.e. all those situations in which the outcomes of an interaction can be determined by the agents themselves and in which the environment cannot interfere with they are able to determine. We will see that two different interpretations can be given of this restriction, both stemming from Pauly Representation Theorem. We will identify such restrictions and axiomatize their logic. We will apply the formal tools to reason about games and their regulation.
Introduction
In the last decades logics for Multi Agent interaction have flourished (Parikh 1985; Alur et al. 2002; Pauly 2001; Pauly and Parikh 2003) . This work has shed light on the logical properties of interaction, giving a formal semantics to notions like "coordination" and "strategy" and allowing to reason on how agents can work together to achieve a desirable property.
Nevertheless, as it happens in many real and artificial cases, things can go wrong and a desirable property may not be reached. One issue is then to find out which agent or group is responsible for such failure, in order to identify or punish it, or even remove it from the system. Responsibility is thus an important feature of regulating multi-agent systems. Furthermore, the question of whether we can assign responsibility to a machine is one of the foundational issues of Artificial Intelligence (SEP 2004) .
352 Synthese (2009) 169:351-369 Whether or not an agent is responsible for a certain outcome has many interpretations. For instance, in stit-theory (as an example see (Horty 2001) ) there is the idea of deliberativeness of choice saying that an agent is responsible for an outcome only if that outcome was chosen among some alternatives. We will not take this stance, and limit ourself to consider instead responsibility as the power to reach an undesirable state. This is the view taken in game logics such as ATL or Coalition Logic, where the focus is on strategic ability, i.e. the power of a coalition of agents to force the interaction to end up in a certain outcome.
In these logics though, the environment is explicitly represented and it can also be responsible. This is also the case in many applications, in which the environment has some interference in the course of events that will take place. In some of these situations it is impossible to understand just observing the final outcome whether the environment or the agents made or ruled out a certain choice. For this reason an issue is to identify those situations in which it is possible to safely formulate a regulation system such that a violation occurs if and only if some agent made it occur.
On the power of the empty set
In a strategic Multi-Agent interaction the set Agt of all agents, or Grand Coalition, may be able to completely decide the outcome of the interaction, and in this case we speak of determinism, or only partially, giving rise to indeterminism.
This issue has been of great importance in the study of Multi Agent Systems. As an evidence, the motivation of Alur Henzinger and Kupferman for introducing ATL mentions the role of indeterminism:
The logics LTL and CTL have their natural interpretations over the computation of a closed system, where a closed system is a system whose behaviour is completely determined by the state of the system. However the compositional modeling and design of reactive systems requires each component to be viewed as an open system, where an open system is a system that interacts with its environment and whose behaviour depends on the state of the system as well as the behaviour of the environment. Models for open systems, such as CPS, I /O Automata and Reactive Modules, distinguish between internal nondeterminism, choices made by the system, and external nondeterminism, choices made by the environment. (Alur et al. 2002, p. 3) In Multi-Agent systems and in Competitive Game Theory the environment is sometimes represented as an agent. In Cooperative Game Theory instead the environment is most naturally represented by the Empty Coalition. Cooperation logics, like ATL and Coalition Logic, that reason about Cooperative Game Structures, reflect this difference. Playable Effectivity Functions, that are Coalition Logic correspondent of strategic games (Pauly 2001) , have the property of Agt-maximality. This property says that all the agents together can only force what is allowed by the environment.
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[756] Synthese (2009) 169:351-369 353 What can happen is that, due to outcome monotonicity, 1 Agt might force the game end up in a set A leaving the environment the possibility of forcing the game to end up in some B ⊆ A. Given this property there may be outcomes of the game that are ruled out by the environment and left open by the agents. As we mentioned before, in Multi-Agent systems in which the environment has some interference power, the violations of the obligations to refrain-we will see an example of it in the coming paragraph-are problematic to detect. The reason is exactly because the environment can refine (as in playable Effectivity Function) the internal indetermism chosen by the agents together.
Example: a social decision
Let us take a version of the Bankruptcy Game, in which an Estate has to be divided among n claimants, with the property that the sum of all the money that the claimants ask may be bigger than the actual value of the Estate (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) .
To simplify the issue, let us suppose that each situation gets associated a real number that corresponds to the least amount of money actually claimed and that we only consider the set Agt of all claimants. For instance Agt may claim A = [5, ∞), to mean that at least value 5 is claimed. It is clear that if Agt forces an interval that comprises only values higher than the Estate, then it forces bankruptcy. This can be seen as an issue of social choice theory (Abdou and Keiding 1991) , where a set of agents are called to determine a global policy.
Suppose now an external mechanism could interfere in the choice of Agt, by imposing its claim to cause bankruptcy. An example of such mechanism is a taxation policy on the claims or a currency devaluation. We can imagine in this fashion to have a system with two states, one in which Agt claims at least an amount of money causing bankruptcy (B), and one in which they claim an amount of money that does not force it: (B, ¬B). Agt's abilities can be so pictured:
In the same fashion we can model the options of the external mechanism. Either it can leave free decision to Agt (no taxation, no devaluation) or it can determine that the choice of Agt does cause bankruptcy (high taxation, devaluation).
Suppose now we were confronted with a legislator who wants to regulate this interaction, forbidding Agt to go bankrupt. In our case the external mechanism-that we henceforth call environment-has interference in the game, and it can decide to transform the game Agt is playing. What should then the legislator do? It is quite clear that imposing the agents to choose something should depend on the moves that are available to the players. But in a game in which the environment plays an interference role, taking this statement serious would boil down to mentioning the environment in the deontic language, saying for instance "The environment should allow the agents to The variety of interpretations that the environment could take are broad. Players for instance may not be aware of their possibilities. In this case the environment is just an epistemic indistinguishability between scenarios: players do not know which of the two (or more) games they are playing. One other interpretation of the environment is the role of the Designer of the system that can interfere with the actions of the players themselves. In the latter case, failure would give rise to collective responsibility (Conte and Paolucci 2004; Grossi et al. 2007 ).
All these interpretations share a common concern. In order to have a regulation of the Multi Agent System, we need a proper agent-oriented deontic language and we should then avoid deontic statements that concern proper choices to be carried out by the environment. A desirable property is then that of ensuring the Empty Coalition not to interfere with the choices of the agents. Or, put it differently, we need to identify all those interactions for which it makes sense to construct a regulation. This translates into ruling out all those in which the environment plays an interference role. In this paper we will pursue this idea formally, identifying such interactions and axiomatizing their logic.
The paper is structured as follows: In the first part we discuss the interpretation of the power of the Empty Coalition in strategic games and we will show how Pauly Representation Theorem-that characterizes them in Coalition Logic-leaves room for different interpretations. In the second part we will introduce two ways to limit the role of the environment. The first is a Closed-World interaction, that limits the Empty Coalition in its interference powers. We prove that its language cannot be defined in Pauly's Coalition Logic (CL), due to the presence of the Inability of the Empty coalition (that ensures the environment not to condition the choices of the other coalitions, IOEC henceforth) and we discuss the axiomatization of Closed-World Coalition Logic (CWCL), an extension of the language of CL, giving a characterization of IOEC in terms of a global modality. In the third part we will introduce Godless Coalition Logic, whose models are disjoint from playable coalition models and whose extension Determined Coalition Logic yet characterize strategic games. We will discuss in depth this apparent paradox. In the fourth part we will discuss some possible applications of these logics to the regulation of interactions. In this section we analyze the actual formulation of this theorem, claiming that its statement leaves room for different interpretations of the power of the empty set. We will later on show that there are other candidate classes that equally characterize strategic games without the environment interfering in the choices of the agents.
We begin by defining the strategic abilities of agents and coalitions, introducing the concept of a dynamic Effectivity Function (EF), adopted from Pauly (2001) .
Definition 1 (Dynamic Effectivity Function) Given a finite set of agents Agt and a set of states W , a dynamic Effectivity Function is a function
Any subset of Agt will henceforth be called a coalition. 2 A dynamic Effectivity Function assigns, in each world, to every coalition a set of sets of states. Intuitively, if X ∈ E(w)(C) the coalition is said to be able to force or determine the state after w to be some member of the set X . If the coalition has this power, it can thus prevent that any state not in X will be the next state, but it might not be able to determine which state in X will be the next state. Possibly, some other coalition will have the power to refine the choice of C.
One important class of Effectivity Functions are the playable ones, to which we will refer throughout the paper.
Definition 2 (Playability) For any world w an Effectivity Function is playable (Pauly 2001) if it has the following properties:
The first condition imposes that interactions are nonempty, the second that coalitions can always choose the largest possible set, the third that the grand coalition of agents-i.e. all agents together-can do whatever not blocked by the environment, the fourth that coalitions can join their forces. Henceforth we will call Agt-superadditive those Effectivity Functions for which superadditivity holds for
) and we will call coalitional-superadditive, or c-superadditive, those for which superadditivity holds for
As proved in Pauly (2001, Theorem 2.27), nonempty strategic games exactly correspond to playable Effectivity Functions.
To better understand the relation between playability and games, we need to define what a game is. Take this to be a tuple G made a set of players Agt, a domain W, a set of strategies i , one for each i ∈ Agt, and an outcome function o that composes the strategies σ C , σ C of two arbitrary coalitions C, C and gives an outcome w ∈ W as a result. Pauly defines what he calls α-effectivity of a nonempty strategic game (where 356 Synthese (2009) 169:351-369 nonempty here means that it is not an end node in a game tree, so it is actually a game that can be played) as a set of subsets of the domain E α G , and the theorem is nothing but proving a property of this relation.
Very simply, E α G can be written as follows:
To link E α G with E the notion of representability is needed. Definition 3 We call an effectivity function E representable if E(C) = E α G (C) for some game G and all coalitions C.
Proposition 1 (Pauly Representation Theorem) An effectivity function is representable if and only if it is playable.
This is Theorem 2.27 from Pauly (2001) . The proof, which we will rediscuss later, is provided there in details.
Space for interpretation
The definition of E α G leaves space for possible interpretations. The problematic case is given by the empty coalition of agents. Let us consider such case:
What is now σ C ? And what is then σ ∅ ? This is to be found in Pauly (2001, p. 16 ).
For notational convenience, let σ C := (σ i ) i∈C denote the strategy tuple for coalition C ⊆ N which consists of player i choosing strategy σ i ∈ i .
Nevertheless when we define an indexed family of sets {x i } i∈I and x ∈ X we should have defined a mapping f : I → X such that f (i) is denoted with x i . What is then the family of strategies σ i for every i ∈ ∅? In this case f : ∅ → for f our function and the set of strategies. But this is nothing but an empty function. In fact, keeping this interpretation, there is no σ ∅ . So no X is in E α G (∅). The standard interpretation instead takes into account the fact that in Pauly's formulation (Definition 2.1 of Strategic Games (Pauly 2001, p. 16) ) the strategy profiles for a coalition are defined in terms of those for individuals, as tuples of individual strategies. So σ i, j stands for some tuple (σ i , σ j ). Given two strategy tuples σ C and σ D , for disjoint C and D, the notation introduced on there suggests that we may write (σ C , σ D ) for the tuple that combines these two. Pauly calls it "the strategy profile induced by" the two tuples. We can safely assume that what it is there meant is that the definition of E α G can be unfolded as follows:
In the first case the list of existential quantifiers is of zero length. From this definition it naturally follows that E(∅) is made by the set of all possible outcomes of G: E is then a playable effectivity function.
Given the two possible interpretations, there are at least two ways of talking of a Closed Interaction. We start first accepting Pauly's interpretation, and introducing a restriction on the strategic ability of the empty set. We will call Closed-World these interactions.
Closed-World interactions
To study Closed-World interaction we isolate a set of properties that are in our view minimally required to formalize this concept, and that constitute the class of ClosedWorld Effectivity Functions.
Definition 4 (Closed-World) For any world w, coalitions C, D, and choice X ⊆ W , an Effectivity Function is coherent if it has the following properties:
inability of the Empty Coalition: E(w)(∅) = {W }.
The first property says that the ability of a coalition is preserved by enlarging the coalition. In this sense we do not allow new members to interfere with the preexistent capacities of a group of agents. The second property says that if a coalition is able to force the outcome of an interaction to lie in a particular set, then no possible combinations of moves by the other agents can prevent this to happen. We think that regularity is a key property to understand the meaning of ability. If an agent is properly able to do something this means that others have no means to prevent it. Outcome monotonicity is a property of all Effectivity Functions in CL, which is therefore a monotonic modal logic. It says that if a coalition is able to force the outcome of the interaction to lie in a particular set, then is also able to force the outcome to lie in all his supersets (see Pauly 2001) . The last condition is IOEC, that assigns to the Empty Coalition the coarsest possible ability. As noticed also in (Borgo 2007) with such a property the Empty Coalition cannot force non-trivial outcomes of a game. For the first part, take W = {x, y}, Agt = {i, j} and the Effectivity Function -369 it is just a matter of checking the conditions for playability. For the second part take 
Back to the example
In our example the abilities of Agt and the external mechanism boiled down to the following power distribution: E(∅) = {{w}, W } = E(Agt). The scenario describes an interaction between a player and an environment that is perfectly conceivable: intuitive properties like regularity and outcome monotonicity are satisfied. The scenario described is a game. Notice that this implies that CL models do allow for external interference.
Closed-World coalition logic
In order to fully understand what sort of interactions we are investigating by using Closed-World Effectivity Functions we need to provide an axiomatization of their logic.
We now introduce the language and the models of Closed-World Coalition Logic, that extends Coalition Logic with an auxiliary existential modality.
Language
Let Agt be a finite set of agents and Prop a countable set of atomic formulas. The syntax of CWCL is defined as follows:
where p ranges over Prop and C ranges over the subsets of Agt. The other boolean connectives are defined as usual. The informal reading of the modalities is: "Coalition C can choose φ" and "There is a state that satisfies φ". We abbreviate ¬E¬φ with Aφ.
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Structures
Definition 5 (Models) A model for our logic is a tuple
where: W is a nonempty set of states; E : W −→ (2 Agt −→ 2 2 W ) is a Closed-World Effectivity Function; R ∃ = W × W is the global relation; V : W −→ 2 Prop is a valuation function.
Semantics
The satisfaction relation of modal formulas (the rest is standard) with respect to a pointed model M, w is defined as follows: 
A sound and complete axiomatization
Take now the maximally consistent sets w ∈ W * , closed under the proof system for CWCL depicted in the table. We take the following conditions to describe ClosedWorld of the Effectivity Function on the canonical relation:
Notice that the following proposition follows from what it is shown in the appendix:
Proposition 5 The canonical Closed-World frame for CL with Aφ ↔ [∅]φ as axiom has the property that E(w)(∅) = W * for any MCS w and Aφ ↔ [∅]φ is valid in the class of frames with that property.
We are now ready to prove soundness and completeness.
Proposition 6 The set of axioms and rules in Tables 1 and 2 are sound and complete with respect to Closed-World Coalition Frames
We need just to check the statement with respect to M * . We omit the detailed proof.
Expressivity
If we add Agt-maximality to Closed-World EF, the following holds: Table 2 Proof system for playable CL A1
This suggest that the augmented version of CWCL is powerful enough to reason on global properties of the models. Moreover a new axiomatization is easy to be obtained.
Proposition 7 Agt-Maximal CWCL is sound and complete with respect to the axiom system of CWCL plus [Agt]φ ↔ Eφ and, as for the canonical relation, the condition
The argument is a straightforward adaptation of the previous proofs. Q.E.D. These results are useful to apply the language to the study of multiagent interactions. Therefore many examples from Game Theory, such as Coordination Game or Prisoner Dilemma, are instances of Closed interactions.
Godless coalition logic
The possible interpretations one could give to the collective strategies in Pauly's theorem allow us to go beyond Closed-World interaction, which is not the only way to avoid interference of the environment on the moves of the players. Taking a view already present in Game Theory and Social Choice (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Abdou and Keiding 1991) we could require the Empty Coalition to have no choice in the interactions. 
Definition 6 An Effectivity Function is Godless if it is outcome monotonic and E(∅) = ∅
A1 [C]φ ∧ [D]ψ → [C ∪ D](φ ∧ ψ) (for C, D = ∅ and C ∩ D = ∅) A3 ¬[C]⊥ (for C = ∅) A4 [C] (for C = ∅) A5 ¬[∅] R1 φ ∧ (φ → ψ) ⇒ ψ R2 φ → ψ ⇒ [C]φ → [C]ψ
Proposition 8 Godless Effectivity Functions are characterizable in Coalition Logic
The proof is straightforward. An axiomatization of Godless Coalition Logic is also a straightforward extension of Minimal Coalition Logic (Modus Ponens and Monotonicity Rule) with ∅ ⊥. The axiomatization for its extension DCL is given in Table 3 .
Recharacterizing nonempty strategic games
Let us call Determined those coalition models that are superadditive, outcome monotonic and Godless. It can easily be observed that Godless models, so Determined models, are disjoint from playable models. Surprisingly enough we can obtain an equivalent characterization of nonempty strategic games. To see this it is first useful to recall the statement of Pauly's Theorem together with its proof.
Proposition 9 (Pauly Representation Theorem) An effectivity function is representable if and only if it is playable.
Proof (from Hansen and Pauly 2002, pp. 4-5) .
We will only sketch the difficult half of the proof (see Pauly 2001 for details) 3 which will be used subsequently, showing that an effectivity function is representable if it is playable.
Given a playable effectivity function E, we shall construct a mechanism G such that E = E α G . To simplify our definition, assume that N = {1, . . ., n}. For i ∈ N let C i = {C ⊆ N |i ∈ C} be the set of coalitions of which i is a member. Let
so F i consists of all functions f i which associate to every coalition C in which i participates a set of outcomes for which C is effective. Note that since for 362 Synthese (2009) 169:351-369 all coalitions C, S ∈ E(C), F i will be nonempty for every player i. Given f ∈ i∈N F i = F N and a coalition C, let P( f, C) be the coarsest partition
Since there are only finitely many players, this process will eventually stop at some state r where P r ( f ) = P r ( f +1) and we let P ∞ = P r ( f ) = C 1 , . . ., C k r . Since for all l ≤ k and i, j ∈ C l we have f j (C l 
) i∈N is a strategy profile and i 0 = ((t 1 +, · · ·, +t n ) + mod n) + 1 indicates the player who has the power to determine the outcome. One can show that for all
One can be tempted to prove this statement:
Conjecture 1 An effectivity function E is representable iff it is Determined.
Nevertheless this would lead straight to contradiction, given disjointness of Playable and Determined models. To overcome the problem we need to define a not ambigous notion of α effectivity. Let us recall the usual definition:
We call E α G the one obtained with Pauly's intuitive interpretation. While E α G is the one obtained by interpreting a sentence starting with ∃ 1 , . . ., ∃ i as a false statement for i = 0.
Definition 7
We call an effectivity function E zero-representable if E(C) = E α G (C) for some game G and all coalitions C.
Now the main statement becomes:

Proposition 10 An effectivity function E is zero-representable iff it is Determined.
For a proof use simply the above quotation by Hansen and Pauly imposing the coalition C to be different from the empty set and requiring E(∅) = ∅.
Zero-representability is not new in the theory of coalitions. Abdou and Kleding in Abdou and Keiding (1991) , for instance, take zero-representability as interpretation for α-effectivity, and they build on that the study of classes of social choice correspondences.
Provided zero-representability, the following result holds:
Proposition 11 The axioms of playability for C = ∅ plus ∅ ⊥ axiomatize the logic of strategic games
Easy to check given the previous results.
Proposition 12 Determined Agt-maximal frames impose surjectivity of the outcome function of the game.
This view is taken in (Abdou and Keiding 1991) . Notice that in this case [Agt]φ ↔ Eφ is a validity.
Comparison
Formally we can draw relations between the above described classed of frames. We call P the class of playable frames, D the class of determined frames, CW the class of Closed-World frames,
We have that Proposition 13
Obligations and responsibilities of the empty coalition
Once we view a deontic language as regulating a Multi Agent System, we can say that a set of commands promote a certain interaction (or social state), prohibiting certain others. Following this line of reasoning it is possible, given a notion of optimality or efficiency, to construct a deontic language that requires this notion to hold (Broersen et al. 2008) . We can now compare how playable, Closed-World and Determined Coalition Models interpret such language. Let us take a deontic operator O,
M is a choice of coalition C guaranteeing a desired outcome. Or more formally, if we take the set Opt to be the set of desired outcomes, we can state
The bankruptcy game with taxation mechanism is only formalizable in playable (P) and Closed-World frames (CW), while Determined frames (D) only formalize taxation free mechanisms.
The following are properties of the frames:
(1) shows that in playable Frames the Empty Coalition is not only obliged to bring about trivialities. In playable Effectivity Functions in fact superaddivity for the Empty Coalition trivializes: we have ∅∩∅ = ∅. So the following law is valid:
, which is nothing but an agglomeration law for the power of the Empty Coalition. As far as regulation is concerned we have thus that:
Nevertheless this is not enough to guarantee that the environment cannot interfere with the choices of the agents (as we saw in the bankruptcy example).
[767] (3) shows that in GCL the only way to put an obligation on the environment is in those situations in which the desired outcomes are actually the only possible outcomes of the system. In GCL the environment is effective for nothing, but it does not mean that the environment is effective for nothing. This latter can be better formalized as ∅ ∈ E(∅), that with Monotonicity Rule would yield an almighty and overresponsible environment.
All the above mentioned validities are dependent on the definition of the deontic operator. Our deontic operator is rather simple and intuitive but it is by no means the only possible one.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have studied those interactions in which the environment cannot interfere with the choices made by the agents, and we provided an axiomatization and decidability of the resulting logics, discussing the possible applications in gametheoretical scenarios. We have clarified the notion of α-effectivity underlying Pauly Representation Theorem and we have shown that two solutions are possible to constrain the role of the environment in strategic interaction. We have shown that this distinction makes sense when constructing a policy to regulate a Multi Agent System.
The work allows for several developments. The epistemic (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007 ) reading of Closed-World interactions can be pushed further by investigating its dynamic aspects. A further connection can be done with the study of freedom and determination (von Wright 1980) with respect to the interference by the environment on the choices of the agents. From the formal point of view have shown that the logic of certain Effectivity Function simulate the universal modality. It would be interesting to bring this correspondence further, as suggested for instance in Hansen (2003) , in order to import further results, such as complexity. it is not so for inability of the Empty Coalition. It is rather clear that [∅]φ → [∅](φ ∨ψ) or also [∅] would not be appropriate axioms for CWCL: they would both ensure the presence of the domain in the neighbourhood of ∅, but they would not say anything about the absence of all the other sets.
In fact the IOEC is not definable in CL. To see this it is important to notice that CL is a monotonic multimodal logic-having the outcome monotonicity rule and Modus Ponens as only rules-and frame validity of formulas of monotonic modal logics is closed under taking disjoint unions. This is proved for modal satisfaction in Hansen (2003, Definition 4.1, Proposition 4.2) .
Definition 8 (Disjoint Unions for MML) Let
, be a collection of disjoint models. Then we define their disjoint union as the model
For a thorough investigation we refer to (Hansen 2003) and to the work of Brian Chellas on Minimal Logic (Chellas 1980) .
Proposition 14 There is no formula of CL that defines IOEC.
Without loss of generality, we can simply think of the monotonic modal logic with only the box for the Empty Coalition, and take frames instead of models. Consider the following monotonic frames (Hansen 2003) we construct the disjoint union ⊕(F 0 , F 1 ) = (W, N ) as previously defined. We see clearly that our formula φ is not true in the disjoint union, because the neighbourhoods of the single models are copied in the disjoint union even if they are smaller than the unit. We observe moreover that the disjoint union is monotonic. The conclusion is that the formula expressing inability of the Empty Coalition is not definable in monotonic modal language. Q.E.D.
As noticed before, IOEC intuitively describes a global property of the models, by requiring an accessibility relation that covers the whole domain.
We will give to this intuition a formal characterization, stating that in fact the ability of the Empty Coalition in CWCL is a global modality.
A.1. IOEC is a global relation
We claim that I O EC is definable in CL plus the global modality. The global relation induces an equivalence class in the models, therefore it is axiomatizable by an S5 modality interpreted on a global relation. However this does not ensure that the underlying relation R ∃ is globally connected. Global connectedness is not characterizable in basic modal language (Blackburn et al. 2001) . 4 As suggested in Blackburn et al. (2001) , pp. 417-418, given a set of maximally consistent formulae + we can simply take a generated submodel of the canonical model in such a way that the truth of formulae in + is preserved and the relation is (it follows by construction) a global relation. The definitions (9 for Basic Modal Language and 10 for Monotonic Modal Language) follow: Taken the canonical model M * = ((W * , E * , R * ∃ ), V * ), its submodel M * = ((W * , E * , R * ∃ ), V * ) generated by + using the R * ∃ relation ensures that R * ∃ = W * × W * . Nevertheless in taking the generated submodel we should also ensure that the coalitional relation is not altered. One way to do so is to guarantee that the canonical coalitional relation is included in the global relation and that the generated submodel for the second relation is also a generated submodel for the first.
Modal satisfaction is invariant under taking generated submodels both in the Basic Modal and in the Monotonic Modal case, that is, for all states of the generated submodels, truth of modal formulas is preserved (Blackburn et al. 2001; Hansen 2003) . It has to be noticed though that the constructions are different, and it is by no means automatic that truth of a formula preserved in one case transfers to the other.
Therefore, in our case, the question is whether the submodel generated using the existential modality through a maximally consistent set of formulas + (making the canonical model strongly connected with respect to this relation) is also a generated submodel with respect to the coalitional relation.
The answer is: it depends on the extra axioms. Usually when we have a K modality and a global modality it is sufficient to include the normal relation corresponding to K in the global relation corresponding to the global modality. But we cannot simply have: [C]φ → Eφ because the canonical relation for the neighbourhood modality may cross S5 equivalence classes. Instead the good candidate for our attempt is just the following:
We claim that taking a generated submodel with respect to the global relation, given this axiom, ensures the condition of taking also a generated submodel with respect to the neighbourhood modality. Now let us take a generated submodel, as described in Blackburn et al. (2001) for basic modal logic, using the maximally consistent set + looking only at the global modality.
Proposition 16
Proposition 17
The generated canonical submodel under + preserves both global modality and monotonic CL formulas satisfaction.
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